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Abstract. In this paper, we investigate the security of the Learning
With Error (LWE) problem with small secrets by refining and improv-
ing the so-called dual lattice attack. More precisely, we use the dual
attack on a projected sublattice, which allows generating instances of
the LWE problem with a slightly bigger noise that correspond to a frac-
tion of the secret key. Then, we search for the fraction of the secret
key by computing the corresponding noise for each candidate using the
newly constructed LWE samples. As secrets are small, we can perform
the search step very efficiently by exploiting the recursive structure of the
search space. This approach offers a trade-off between the cost of lattice
reduction and the complexity of the search part which allows to speed
up the attack. Besides, we aim at providing a sound and non-asymptotic
analysis of the techniques to enable its use for practical selection of se-
curity parameters. As an application, we revisit the security estimates
of some fully homomorphic encryption schemes, including the Fast Fully
Homomorphic Encryption scheme over the Torus (TFHE) which is one of
the fastest homomorphic encryption schemes based on the (Ring-)LWE
problem. We provide an estimate of the complexity of our method for
various parameters under three different cost models for lattice reduc-
tion and show that the security level of the TFHE scheme should be
re-evaluated according to the proposed improvement (for at least 7 bits
for the most recent update of the parameters that are used in the imple-
mentation).
1 Introduction
The Learning With Errors (LWE) problem was introduced by Regev [38] in 2005.
A key advantage of LWE is that it is provably as hard as certain lattice approxi-
mation problems in the worst-case [11], which are believed to be hard even on a
quantum computer. The LWE problem has been a rich source of cryptographic
constructions. As a first construction, Regev proposed an encryption scheme,
but the flexibility of this security assumption proved to be extremely appealing
to construct feature-rich cryptography [12,27].
Among these constructions, Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) is a very
interesting primitive, as it allows performing arbitrary operations on encrypted
data without decrypting it. A first FHE scheme relying on the so-called ideal
lattices was proposed in a breakthrough work of Gentry [26]. After several tweaks
and improvements through the years, the nowadays popular approaches to FHE
rely on the LWE problem or its variants (e.g. [10, 18,22,23,28]).
Informally, when given several samples of the form (a, 〈a, s〉+e mod q) where
s is secret, a ∈ Znq is uniform and e is some noise vector, the LWE problem is to
recover s.
In its original formulation, the secret vector is sampled uniformly at random
from Znq , but more recent LWE-based constructions choose to use distribution
with small entropy for the secret key to increase efficiency. For example, some
FHE schemes use binary [19,22], ternary [14], or even ternary sparse secrets [29].
Theoretical results are supporting these choices, which show that the LWE re-
mains hard even with small secrets [11]. In practice, however, such distributions
can lead to more efficient attacks [7, 17,39].
The security of a cryptosystem, of course, depends on the complexity of the
most efficient known attack against it. In particular, to estimate the security of
an LWE-based construction, it is important to know which attack is the best for
the parameters used in the construction. It can be a difficult issue; indeed, the
survey of existing attacks against LWE given in [6] shows that no known attack
would be the best for all sets of LWE parameters.
In this article, we are interested in evaluating the practical security of the
LWE problem with such small secrets. As an application, we consider the bit-
security of several very competitive FHE proposals, such as the Fast Fully Homo-
morphic Encryption scheme over the Torus [19, 20, 21], FHEW [22], SEAL [32],
and HElib [29]. The security of these constructions relies on the hardness of
variants of the LWE problem which can all be encompassed in a scale-invariant
version named Torus-LWE. This “learning a character” problem, captures both
the celebrated LWE and Ring-LWE problems.
In the case of TFHE, in [20], the authors adapted and used the dual distin-
guishing lattice attack from [2] to evaluate the security of their scheme. Recently,
in [21, Remark 9], the authors propose an updated set of the parameters for their
scheme and estimate the security of the new parameters using the LWE estima-
tor from [4]. It turns out that this approach falls into the caveat we described
above: the estimator relies on attacks that are not fine-tailored to capture the
peculiar choice of distributions. According to the LWE estimator, the best attack
against the current TFHE parameters is the unique-SVP attack [7].
1.1 Contributions and overview of the techniques
We present our work in the generic context of the so-called scale-invariant LWE
problem or Torus-LWE, which appears to give a more flexible mathematical
framework to perform the analysis of the attacks. We aim at extending the use-
case of the dual lattice attack which is currently one of the two main techniques
used to tackle the LWE problem. Given Torus-LWE samples collected in matrix
form ~At~s + ~e = ~b mod 1, the vanilla dual attack consists in finding a vector ~v
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such that ~vt ~At = 0 mod 1, yielding the equation ~vt~e = ~vt~b mod 1. Since ~vt~e
should be small, we can then distinguish it from a random vector in the torus.
A refined analysis of the dual attack. First, we introduce a complete
non-asymptotic analysis of the standard dual lattice attack5 on LWE. In par-
ticular, we prove non-asymptotic bounds on the number of samples and the
corresponding bit-complexity of the method, allowing precise instantiations for
parameter selection6. To do so, we introduce an unbiased estimator of the Levy
transform for real random variables that allows us to sharpen the analysis of the
attack.
The intuition behind these techniques is the following. The crux of the dual
attack is distinguishing the Gaussian distribution modulo 1 from the uniform
distribution. Since we are working modulo 1, a natural approach is to tackle
the problem by harmonic analysis techniques. Moving to the Fourier space is
done by the so-called Levy transform (which is essentially given by x 7→ e2iπx).
In this space, the Levy transform of the Gaussian distribution mod 1 and the
full Gaussian distribution coincides, so we somehow get rid of the action of the
modulo. Then we use Berry-Esseen inequality to derive sharper bounds. We hope
these techniques may find other interests for the community.
A hybrid enumeration/dual attack. In the second step, we show that
applying the dual attack to a projected sublattice and combining it with the
search for a fraction of the key can yield a more efficient attack. It can be
considered as a dimension reduction technique, trading the enumeration time
with the dimension of the lattice attack. More precisely, we obtain a trade-
off between the quality of lattice reduction in the dual attack part and the
time subsequently spent in the exhaustive search. Additionally, for the lattice
reduction algorithms using sieving as an SVP-oracle, we demonstrate that the
pool of short vectors obtained by the sieving process can be used to amortize
the cost of the reduction part. We also discuss possible improvements based on
so-called ”combinatorial” techniques, where we perform a random guess of the
zero positions of the secret if it is sparse enough.
In a word, our attack starts by applying lattice reduction to a projected
sublattice in the same way as it is applied to the whole lattice in the dual attack.
This way, we generate LWE instances with bigger noise but in smaller dimension,
corresponding to a fraction of the secret key. Then, the freshly obtained instances
are used to recover the remaining fraction of the secret key. For each candidate
for this missing fraction, we compute the noise vector corresponding to the LWE
instances obtained at the previous step. This allows us to perform a majority
voting procedure to detect the most likely candidates. For small secrets, this step
boils down to computing a product of a matrix of the LWE samples with the
matrix composed of all the possible parts of the secret key that we are searching
5 We point out that this attack is slightly more subtle than the vanilla dual technique,
as it encompasses a continuous relaxation of the lazy modulus switching technique
of [2].
6 Up to our knowledge previous analyses rely on instantiation of asymptotic inequali-
ties and overlook the practical applicability.
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for. We show that this computation can be performed efficiently thanks to the
recursive structure of the corresponding search space.
Applications. In the last part, we estimate the complexity of our attack
under three different models of lattice reduction and compare the complexity of
our attack with the standard dual attack and with the primal unique-SVP attack
for a wide range of LWE parameters in the case of small non-sparse secrets.
Concerning the comparison with the primal unique-SVP attack, both attacks
give quite close results. Our attack is better than uSVP when the dimension and
the noise parameter are big, the uSVP attack is better when the dimension is big
and the noise parameter is small (see Figure 10). We also provide experiments
in small dimensions, supporting the whole analysis.
To evaluate the practicality of our approach, we apply our attack to the se-
curity analysis of competitive FHE schemes, namely TFHE [21], FHEW [22],
SEAL [32], and HElib [29]. We show that our hybrid dual attack gives improve-
ment compared to the unique-SVP or dual technique of [4] for the latest TFHE’s,
FHEW’s and SEAL’s parameters. In case of sparse secrets in the HElib scheme,
our attack doesn’t provide improvements over the dual attack from [2], but gives
comparable results.
The results of our comparison for the TFHE scheme are presented in Table 1.
parameters (n, α) dual [2, 4] this work uSVP [4]
Old param.
switching key
n = 500, α = 2.43 · 10−5 113 94 101
bootstrapping key
n = 1024, α = 3.73 · 10−9 125 112 116
New param.
switching key
n = 612, α = 2−15
140 118 123
bootstrapping key




n = 630, α = 2−15
144 121 127
bootstrapping key
n = 1024, α = 2−25
140 125 129
Table 1: Security estimates of the parameters of TFHE from [21, Table 3, Table
4] and from the public implementation [40]. n denotes the dimension, α is the
parameter of the modular Gaussian distribution. The bold numbers denote the
overall security of the scheme for a given set of parameters. The “uSVP” column
corresponds to the estimates obtained using the LWE Estimator [4] for the primal
uSVP attack. For the lattice reduction algorithm, in all the cases, the sieving
BKZ cost model is used.
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1.2 Related work
The survey [6] outlines three strategies for attacks against LWE: exhaustive
search, BKW algorithm [3,9], and lattice reduction. Lattice attacks against LWE
can be separated into three categories depending on the lattice used: distin-
guishing dual attacks [2], decoding (primal) attacks [34, 35], and solving LWE
by reducing it to the unique Shortest Vector Problem (uSVP) [5].
The idea of a hybrid lattice reduction attack was introduced by Howgrave–
Graham in [31]. He proposed to combine a meet-in-the-middle attack with lattice
reduction to attack NTRUEncrypt. Then, Buchmann et al. adapted Howgrave–
Graham’s attack to the settings of LWE with binary error [13] and showed that
the hybrid attack outperforms existing algorithms for some sets of parameters.
This attack uses the decoding (primal) strategy for the lattice reduction part.
Following these two works, Wunderer has provided an improved analysis of the
hybrid decoding lattice attack and meet-in-the-middle attack and re-estimated
security of several LWE and NTRU based cryptosystems in [41]. Also, very
recently, a similar combination of primal lattice attack and meet-in-the-middle
attack was applied to LWE with ternary and sparse secret [39]. This last reference
shows that the hybrid attack can also outperform other attacks in the case of
ternary and sparse secrets for parameters typical for FHE schemes.
A combination of the dual lattice attack with guessing for a part of the secret
key was considered in [2, Section 5], in the context of sparse secret keys. Also,
recently, a similar approach was adapted to the case of ternary and sparse keys
in [17]. Both of these articles can be seen as dimension reduction techniques
as they both rely on a guess of the part of the secret to perform the attack in
smaller dimension. They gain in this trade-off by exploiting the sparsity of the
secret: guessing the position of zero bits will trade positively with the dimension
reduction as soon as the secret is sparse enough. However, the main difference
of this work compared to [2, 17] is that the secret is not required to be sparse,
and thus can be considered to be slightly more general. We positively trade-off
with the dimension gain by exploiting the recursive structure of the small secret
space. However, all these techniques are not incompatible! In Section 4.4, we
propose a combination of the guessing technique with our approach, allowing us
to leverage at the same time the sparsity and the structure of small secrets.
Overall we can consider this work as providing a proper dual analog of
enumeration-hybrid technique existing for primal attacks.
Outline. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide the
necessary background on lattice reduction and probability. In Section 3, we re-
visit the dual lattice attack and provide a novel and sharper analysis of this
method. In Section 4, we describe our hybrid dual lattice attack and discuss its
extension to sparse secrets. In Section 5, we compare the complexities of different
attacks, revisit the security estimate of TFHE, and several other FHE schemes
and provide some experimental evidence supporting our analysis.
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2 Background
We use column notation for vectors and denote them using bold lower-case let-
ters (e.g. x). Matrices are denoted using bold upper-case letters (e.g. A). For a
vector x, xt denotes the transpose of x, i.e., the corresponding row-vector. Base-
2 logarithm is denoted as log, natural logarithm is denoted as ln. We denote the
set of real numbers modulo 1 as the torus T. For a finite set S, we denote by
|S| its cardinality and by U(S) the discrete uniform distribution on its elements.
For any compact set S ⊂ Rn, the uniform distribution over S is also denoted by
U(S). When S is not specified, U denotes uniform distribution over (−0.5; 0.5).
2.1 The LWE problem
Abstractly, all operations of the TFHE scheme are defined on the real torus T
and to estimate the security of the scheme it is convenient to consider a scale-
invariant version of LWE problem.
Definition 1 (Learning with Errors, [11, Definition 2.11]). Let n > 1,
s ∈ Zn, ξ be a distribution over R and S be a distribution over Zn. We define
the LWEs,ξ distribution as the distribution over Tn × T obtained by sampling a
from U(Tn), sampling e from ξ and returning (a,ats + e).
Given access to outputs from this distribution, we can consider the two fol-
lowing problems:
– Decision-LWE. Distinguish, given arbitrarily many samples, between U(Tn × T)
and LWEs,ξ distribution for a fixed s sampled from S.
– Search-LWE. Given arbitrarily many samples from LWEs,ξ distribution with
fixed s← S, recover the vector s.
To complete the description of the LWE problem we need to choose the error
distribution ξ and the distribution of the secret key S. Given a finite set of
integers B, we define S to be U(Bn) and ξ to be a centered continuous Gaus-
sian distribution, i.e., we consider the LWE problem with binary secret. This
definition captures the binary and ternary variants of LWE by choosing B to
be respectively {0, 1} and {−1, 0, 1}. In [11], it is shown that this variation of
LWE with small secrets remains hard. Finally, we use the notation LWEs,σ as
a shorthand for LWEs,ξ, when ξ is the Gaussian distribution centered at 0 and
with standard deviation σ.
2.2 Lattices
A lattice Λ is a discrete subgroup of Rd. As such, a lattice Λ of rank n can be
described as a set of all integer linear combinations of n 6 d linearly independent
vectors B = {b1, . . . ,bd} ⊂ Rd:
Λ = L(B) := Zb1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Zbd,
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called a basis. Bases are not unique, one lattice basis may be transformed into
another one by applying an arbitrary unimodular transformation. The volume
of the lattice vol(Λ) is equal to the square root of the determinant of the Gram
matrix BtB: vol(Λ) =
√
det(BtB). For every lattice Λ we denote the length of
its shortest non-zero vector as λ1(Λ). Minkowski’s theorem states that λ1(Λ) 6√
γn · vol(Λ)1/n for any d-dimensional lattice Λ, where γd < d is d-dimensional
Hermite’s constant. The problem of finding the shortest non-zero lattice vector
is called the Shortest Vector Problem(SVP). It is known to be NP-hard under
randomized reduction [1].
2.3 Lattice reduction
A lattice reduction algorithm is an algorithm which, given as input some ba-
sis of the lattice, finds a basis that consists of relatively short and relatively
pairwise-orthogonal vectors. The quality of the basis produced by lattice reduc-










be reached in polynomial time using the LLL algorithm [33]. In order to obtain
smaller Hermite factors, blockwise lattice reduction algorithms, like BKZ-2.0 [16]
or S-DBKZ [37], can be used. The BKZ algorithm takes as input a basis of di-
mension d and proceeds by solving SVP on lattices of dimension β < d using
sieving [8] or enumeration [25]. The quality of the output of BKZ depends on the
blocksize β. In [30] it is shown that after a polynomial number of calls to SVP









However, up to our knowledge, there is no closed formula that tightly connects
the quality and complexity of the BKZ algorithm. In this work, we use exper-
imental models proposed in [3, 4] in order to estimate the running time and
quality of the output of lattice reduction. They are based on the following two
assumptions on the quality and shape of the output of BKZ. The first assumption
states that the BKZ algorithm outputs vectors with balanced coordinates, while
the second assumption connects the Hermite factor δ with the chosen blocksize
β.
Assumption 21 Given as input, a basis B of a d-dimensional lattice Λ, BKZ
outputs a vector of norm close to δd · det(Λ)1/d with balanced coordinates. Each
coordinate of this vector follows a distribution that can be approximated by a
Gaussian with mean 0 and standard deviation δd det(Λ)1/d/
√
d.











This assumption is experimentally verified in [15].
BKZ cost models. To estimate the running time of BKZ, we use three
different models. The first model is an extrapolation by Albrecht [3] et al. of
the Liu–Nguyen datasets [35]. According to that model, the logarithm of the






We further refer to this model as the delta-squared model. The model was used
in [20] to estimate the security of TFHE.
Another cost model [4] assumes that the running time of BKZ with blocksize
β for d-dimensional basis is T (BKZβ,d) = 8d · T (SVPβ), where T (SVPβ) is the
running time of an SVP oracle in dimension β. For the SVP oracle, we use the
following two widely used models:
Sieving model: T (SVPβ) ≈ 20.292β+16.4,
Enumeration model: T (SVPβ) ≈ 20.187β log(β)−1.019β+16.1.






short vectors while solving SVP on an n-dimensional lattice. Therefore, when






2 short lattice vectors, where β is the chosen blocksize. As such, we
shall provide the following heuristic, which generalizes the repartition given in
Assumption 21 when the number of output vectors is small with regards to the
number of possible vectors of the desired length:
Assumption 23 Let R  δd2Vd and R 6 (4/3)β/2 where Vd is the volume of
the `2 unit ball in dimension d. Given as input, a basis B of a d-dimensional
lattice Λ, BKZβ with a sieving oracle as SVP oracle outputs a set of R vectors of
norm close to δd · det(Λ)1/d with balanced coordinates. Each coordinate of these
vector follows a distribution that can be approximated by a Gaussian with mean
0 and standard deviation δd det(Λ)1/d/
√
d.
In practice, for the dimensions involved in cryptography, this assumption
can be experimentally verified. In particular, for the parameters tackled in this
work, the number of vectors used by the attack is way lower than the number
of potential candidates. An experimental verification of this fact is conducted
in Section 5.4. In general settings (when we need to look at all the vectors of
the sieving pool), one might see this exploitation as a slight underestimate of
the resulting security parameters. An interesting open problem that we leave for
future work as it is unrelated to the attacks mounted here, would be to quantify
precisely the distribution of the sieved vectors.
A related idea seems quite folklore in the lattice reduction community. In
particular, in [2], the output basis of the reduction is randomized with slight
enumeration and a pass of LLL for instance. This approach is slightly more
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costly than just extracting the sieved vectors but is comparable for its effect as
an amortization technique when a batch reduction is needed.
2.4 Background on probability theory
Modular Gaussian distribution. Let σ > 0. For all x ∈ R, the density of the









. We define the distribution that is obtained by sampling a
centered Gaussian distribution of standard deviation σ and reducing it modulo
1 as the modular Gaussian distribution of parameter σ and denote it as Gσ.






. The probability density function





For large values of σ, the sum that defines the density of a modular Gaussian
can be closely approximated.
Lemma 1. As σ →∞, gσ(x) = 1 + 2e−2π
2σ2 cos(2πx) +O(e−8π
2σ2).






is given by ρ̂σ,m(y) = e



















Berry-Esseen inequality. The Berry-Esseen inequality shows how closely the
distribution of the sum of independent random variables can be approximated
by a Gaussian distribution.
Theorem 1. Let X1, . . . , Xn be independent random variables such that for all








σ2i as Sn. Also denote by Fn the cumulative
distribution function of Sn, and by Φ the cumulative distribution function of the
standard normal distribution. Then, there exists a constant C0 such that
sup
x∈R








We use the Berry-Esseen inequality in order to estimate how closely the
distribution that we obtain after the lattice reduction step of the dual attack
can be approximated by a discrete Gaussian distribution (see Lemma 3). The
Berry-Esseen inequality requires a finite third absolute moment of the random
variables. In the proof of Lemma 3, we need the expression of third absolute
moment of a Gaussian distribution. It can be obtained from the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Let σ > 0. Let X be a random variable of a Gaussian distribution
















Hoeffding’s inequality. Hoeffding’s inequality gives an exponentially decreasing
upper bound on the probability that the sum of bounded independent random
variables deviates from its expectation by a certain amount.
Theorem 2. Let X1, . . . , XN be independent random variables such that ai 6
Xi 6 bi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Denote the average 1N
N∑
i=1
Xi as X̄. Then, for
t > 0, we have
P{





In this paper, we use Hoeffding’s inequality to construct a distinguisher for the
uniform and the modular Gaussian distributions (see Section 3.2).
3 Dual distinguishing attack against LWE.
In this first section, we revisit the distinguishing dual attack against LWE (or
more precisely for the generic corresponding scale-invariant problem described
in [11,21]), providing complete proofs and introducing finer tools as a novel dis-
tinguisher for the uniform distribution and the modular Gaussian. In particular,
all the results are non-asymptotic and can be used for practical instantiations of
the parameters. Note that it also naturally encompasses a continuous relaxation
of the lazy modulus switching technique of [2], as the mathematical framework
used makes it appear very naturally in the proof technique.
Settings. In all of the following, we denote by B a finite set of integers
(typically {0, 1} or {−1, 0, 1}). Let s ∈ Bn be a secret vector and let α > 0 be
a fixed constant. The attack takes as input m samples (a1, b1), . . . , (am, bm) ∈
Tn+1 × T which are either all from LWEs,α distribution or all from U(Tn × T),
and guesses the input distribution.
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We can write input samples in a matrix form:
A := (a1, . . . ,am) ∈ Tn×m, b = (b1, . . . , bm)t ∈ Tm,
if input samples are from the LWEs,α distribution: b = A
ts + e mod 1.
Distinguisher reduction using a small trapdoor. To distinguish be-
tween the two distributions, the attack searches for a short vector v = (v1, . . . , vm)
t ∈
Zm such that the linear combination of the left parts of the inputs samples de-




viai = Av mod 1
is also a short vector. If the input was from the LWE distribution, then the
corresponding linear combination of the right parts of the input samples is also
small as a sum of two relatively small numbers:
vtb = vt(Ats + e) = xts + vte mod 1. (3)
On the other hand, if the input is uniformly distributed, then independently
of the choice of the non-zero vector v, the product v · b mod 1 has uniform
distribution on (−1/2; 1/2). Recovering a suitable v thus turns the decisional-
LWE problem into an easier problem of distinguishing two distributions on T.
This remaining part of this section is organized in the following way. First,
in Section 3.1 we describe how such a suitable vector v can be discovered by
lattice reduction and analyze the distribution of vtb. Then, in Section 3.2, we
estimate the complexity of distinguishing two distributions on T that we obtain
after this first part. Finally, Section 3.3 estimates the time complexity of the
whole attack.
3.1 Trapdoor construction by lattice reduction
Finding a vector v such that both parts of the sum (3) are small when the input


















A short vector in L(A) can be found by applying a lattice reduction algorithm
to the basis B. Using Assumption 21, we expect that the lattice reduction process
produces a vector w = (x||v)t ∈ Zn+m with equidistributed coordinates. Our
goal is to minimize the product vtb = xts+vte. The vectors e and s come from
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different distributions and have different expected norms. For practical schemes,
the variance of e is much smaller than the variance of s. To take this imbalance
into account, one introduces an additional rescaling parameter q ∈ R>0. The
first n rows of the matrix B are multiplied by q, the last m rows are multiplied
by q−n/m. Obviously, this transformation doesn’t change the determinant of the







We apply a lattice reduction algorithm to Bq. Denote the first vector of the
reduced basis as wq. By taking the last m coordinates of wq and multiplying
them by qn/m we recover the desired vector v. This technique can be thought
of as a continuous relaxation of the modulus switching technique. That part of
the attack is summarized in Algorithm 3.
The following lemma describes the distribution of the output of Algorithm 3
under Assumption 21 that BKZ outputs vectors with balanced coordinates.




2 and n ∈ Z>0. Let s be a vector such that of its coefficients are
sampled independently and uniformly in B. Suppose that Assumption 21 holds
and let δ > 0 be the quality of the output of the BKZ algorithm. Then, given as
input m =
√
n · ln(S/α)ln(δ) − n samples from the LWEs,α distribution, Algorithm 3
outputs a random variable x with a distribution that can be approximated by a
Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation σ







Denote as Fx the cumulative distribution function of x and denote as Φσ the
cumulative distribution function of the Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and
standard deviation σ. Then, the distance between the two distributions can be
bounded: sup
t∈R






The crux of the proof of Lemma 3 relies on the Berry-Esseen theorem. We provide
the complete details in Section 6.1.
3.2 Exponential kernel distinguisher for the uniform and the
modular Gaussian distributions
We now describe a novel distinguisher for the uniform and the modular Gaus-
sian distributions. Formally, we construct a procedure that takes as input N
samples which are all sampled independently from one of the two distributions
and guesses this distribution.
The crux of our method relies on the use of an empirical estimator of the
Levy transform of the distributions, to essentially cancel the effect of the modulus
1 on the Gaussian. Namely, from the N samples X1, . . . , XN , we construct the
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estimator Ȳ = 1N ·
N∑
i=1
e2πiXi . As N is growing to infinity, this estimator converges
to the Levy transform at 0 of the underlying distribution, that is to say:
– to 0 for the uniform distribution
– to e−2π
2σ2 for the modular Gaussian.
Hence, to distinguish the distribution used to draw the samples, we now only
need to determine whether the empirical estimator Ȳ is closer to 0 or to e−2π
2σ2 .
The corresponding algorithm is described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Distinguish U and Gσ







, σ > 0, sampled independently from U or Gσ
output: A guess: G if the samples are drawn under Gσ or U otherwise
1 DistinguishGU(X1, . . . , XN , σ):






3 if (Ȳ 6 1
2
· e−2π
2σ2) then return U ;
4 return G
Lemma 4. Let σ > 0 be a fixed constant. Assume that Algorithm 1 is given
as input N points that are sampled independently from the uniform distribution
U or from the modular Gaussian distribution Gσ. Then, Algorithm 1 guesses







. The time complexity of the algorithm is polynomial in
the size of the input.







(−1; 1]. First, we compute the expectation of Ȳ = 1N ·
N∑
i=1
Yi in the two possible
cases where Xis are sampled from the uniform distribution, and where Xis are
sampled from the modular Gaussian with standard deviation σ. Note that, in
both cases, as Xis are sampled independently and identically from the same
distribution, E{Ȳ } = E{Yi}.
In case of the uniform distribution, the expectation of the real part of Ȳ is




e2πixdx = 0. (4)
13
Now in case of the modular Gaussian distribution, we exploit the 1-periodicity






































2σ2 dx = e−2π
2σ2 , (7)
the sum-integral exchange being justified by uniform convergence of the sum.
Now, using the expectations of Ȳ and the Hoeffding’s inequality, we can
estimate the probability of getting a correct guess.
First, consider the probability wrongly guessing when the distribution of the
input is uniform. By Line 3 of Algorithm 1, it is given by:





Since Yis are bounded, i.e., for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, Yi ∈ (−1; 1], we can use









Similarly, we get the same bound on the probability of the wrong guess when
the distribution of the input is the modular Gaussian:






. Together with Equation (8), we get the bound
on the probability of the successful guess.
Since Algorithm 1 consists of computing the average of the input sample and
performing one comparison, it is polynomial in the size of the input.
Lemma 4 implies that to distinguish the uniform distribution and the modu-
lar Gaussian distribution with the parameter σ with a non-negligible probability,
we need to take a sample of size N = O(e4π
2σ2).
Remark 1. The dual attack proposed in [21], does not specify, which algorithm
is used for distinguishing the uniform and the modular Gaussian distributions.
Instead, to estimate the size of the sample, needed to distinguish the distribu-
tions, they estimate the statistical distance ε (see [21, Section 7, Equation(6)]
and use O(1/ε2) as an estimate for the required size of the sample. However,
such an estimate does not allow a practical instantiation in the security analy-
sis since it hides the content of the O. It turns out that the exponential kernel
distinguisher, described in Algorithm 1 has the same asymptotic complexity as
the statistical distance estimate from [21] suggests, while enjoying a sufficiently
precise analysis to provide non-asymptotic parameter estimation.
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3.3 Complexity of the dual attack
The distinguishing attack is summarized in Algorithm 2. It takes as input m×N
samples from an unknown distribution, then transforms them into N samples
which have the uniform distribution if the input of the attack was uniform and
the modular Gaussian distribution if the input was from the LWE distribution.
Then, the attack guesses the distribution of N samples using Algorithm 1 and
outputs the corresponding answer.
Algorithm 2: Dual distinguishing attack
input : {(Ai,bi)}Ni=1, where ∀i Ai ∈ Tn×m, bi ∈ Tm, α > 0, S > 0,
δ ∈ (1; 1.1)
output: guess for the distribution of the input: Uniform or LWE distribution
1 DistinguishingAttack({Ai,bi}Ni=0, α, S, δ):
2 X := ∅






4 for i ∈ {1, . . . , N} do
5 x← LWEtoModGaussian(Ai,bi, S, α, δ)
6 X ← X ∪ x
7 if (DistinguishGU(X,σ) = G) then
8 return LWE distribution
9 else
10 return Uniform
The following theorem states that the cost of the distinguishing attack can
be estimated by solving a minimization problem. The proof is deferred to Sec-
tion 6.1.




2 and n ∈ Z>0. Let s be a vector with all coefficients sampled
independently and uniformly in B. Suppose that Assumption 21 holds. Then, the
time complexity of solving Decision-LWEs,α with probability of success p by the




N(σ, p) · T (BKZδ)
)
, (9)






, N(σ, p) = 8 ln( 11−p ) · e
4π2σ2 .
Proof. The cost of the attack is the cost of the lattice reduction multiplied by
the number of samples N needed to distinguish the uniform distribution and the
modular Gaussian distribution with the parameter σ:
T = N · T (BKZδ). (10)
By Lemma 4, Algorithm 1, given as an input a sample of size N , guesses its
distribution correctly with the probability at least 1 − exp
(






Thus, in order to achieve the probability p, we need to produce a sample of size
N(σ, p) = 8 ln( 11−p ) · e
4π2σ2 .
The parameter σ of the discrete Gaussian distribution as a function of δ can
be estimated using Lemma 3. Then, the time complexity can be obtained by
optimizing the expression, given by Equation (10), as a function of δ.
4 Towards a hybrid dual key recovery attack
In this section, we show how the dual distinguishing attack recalled in Section 3
can be hybridized with exhaustive search on a fraction of the secret vector to
obtain a continuum of more efficient key recovery attacks on the underlying LWE
problem. Recall that B is a finite set of integers from which the coefficients of
the secret are drawn. Let then s ∈ Bn be a secret vector and let α > 0 be a
fixed constant. Our approach takes as input samples from the LWE distribution
of form
(A,b = Ats + e mod 1) ∈ (Tn×m,Tm), (11)
where e ∈ Rm has centered Gaussian distribution with standard deviation α.
The attack divides the secret vector into two fractions:
s = (s1||s2)t, s1 ∈ Bn1 , s2 ∈ Bn2 , n = n1 + n2.




a1,1 . . . a1,m
...
...
an1,1 . . . an1,m
an1+1,1 . . . an1+1,m
... . . .
...








Then, Equation (11) can be rewritten as
At1s1 + A
t
2s2 + e = b mod 1.
By applying lattice reduction to matrix A1 as described in Algorithm 3, we
recover a vector v such that vt(At1s1 +e) is small and it allows us to transforms
m input LWE samples (A,b) ∈ (Tn×m,Tm) into one new LWE sample (â, b̂) ∈









The resulting LWE sample in smaller dimension can be used to find s2. Let
x ∈ Bn2 be a guess for s2. If the guess is correct, then the difference
b̂− âtx = b̂− âts2 = (ê mod 1) ∼ Gσ (14)
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Algorithm 3: Transform m LWE samples to one sample from modular
Gaussian distribution
input : A ∈ Tn×m, b ∈ Tm, S > 0, α > 0, δ ∈ (1; 1.1)
output: x ∈ T













4 wq ← BKZδ(Bq)
5 v := qn/m · (wqn+1, . . . wqn+m)
t
6 return (v)
7 LWEtoModGaussian(A, b, S, α, δ):
8 v← computeV(A, S, α, δ)
9 return vtb mod 1
is small.
If the guess is not correct and x 6= s2, then there exist some y 6= 0 such that
x = s2 − y. Then, we rewrite b̂− âtx in the following way:
b̂− âtx = (b̂− âts2) + âty = âty + ê.
We can consider (â, âty + ê) as a sample from the LWE distribution that corre-
sponds to the secret y. Therefore, we may assume that if x 6= s2, the distribution
of b̂− âtx mod 1 is close to uniform, unless the decision-LWE is easy to solve.
In order to recover s2, the attack generates many LWE samples with reduced
dimension. Denote by R the number of generated samples and put them into
matrix form as (Â, b̂) ∈ Tn2×R × TR. There are |B|n2 possible candidates for
s2. For each candidate x ∈ Bn2 , the attack computes an R-dimensional vector
ex = b − Ats. The complexity of this computation for all the candidates is
essentially the complexity of multiplying the matrices Â and S2, where S2 is
a matrix whose columns are all vectors of (the projection of) the secret space
in dimension n2. Naively, the matrix multiplication requires O(n · |B|n2 · R)
operations. However, by exploiting the recursive structure of S2, it can be done
in time O(R · |B|n2).
Then, for each candidate x for s2 the attack checks whether the corresponding
vector ex is uniform or concentrated around zero distribution. The attack returns
the only candidate x whose corresponding vector ex has concentrated around
zero distribution.
The rest of this section is organized as follows. First, we describe the auxiliary
algorithm for multiplying a matrix by the matrix of all vectors of the secret space
that let us speed up the search for the second fraction of the secret key. Then,
we evaluate the complexity of our attack.
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4.1 Algorithm for computing the product of a matrix with the
matrix of all vectors in a product of finite set
Let B = {b1, . . . , bk} ⊂ Z be a finite set of integer numbers such that bi < bi+1
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}. For any positive integer d, denote by S(d) the matrix
whose columns are all vectors from {b1, . . . , bk}d written in the lexicographical
order. These matrices can be constructed recursively. For d = 1 the matrix is a
single row, i.e., S(1) =
(
b1 . . . bk
)
, and for any d > 1 the matrix S(d) ∈ Zd×k
d
can be constructed by concatenating k copies of the matrix S(d−1) and adding a
row which consists of kd−1 copies of b1 followed by k
d−1 copies of b2 and so on:
S(d) =
(
b1 . . . b1 b2 . . . b2 . . . bk . . . bk
S(d−1) S(d−1) . . . S(d−1)
)
. (15)
Let a = (a1, . . . , ad)
t be a d-dimensional vector. Our goal is to compute
the scalar products of a with each column of S(d). We can do it by using the
recursive structure of S(d). Assume that we know the desired scalar products for
a(d−1) = (a2, . . . , ad)









b1 . . . b1 . . . bk . . . bk




(a1 · b1, . . . , a1 · b1)t + at(d−1)S(d−1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ . . . ∣∣∣∣∣∣
(a1 · bk, . . . , a1 · bk)t + at(d−1)S(d−1)
) (16)
that is, the resulting vector is the sum of the vector at(d−1)S(d−1) concatenated
with itself k times with the vector consisting of kd−1 copies of a1 ·b1 concatenated
with kd−1 copies of a1 ·b2 and so on. The approach is summarized in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4: Compute a scalar product of a matrix of all vectors from
{b1, . . . , bk}d.
input : a = (a1, . . . , ad)
t, B = {b1, . . . , bk} ⊂ Z such that b1 < b2 < · · · < bk.
output: atS(d), where S(d) ∈ {b1, . . . , bk}k
d×d is the matrix whose columns
are all the vectors from the set {b1, . . . , bk}d written in the
lexicographical order
1 computeScalarProductWithAllVectors(a, B):
2 x← (ad · b1, . . . , ad · bk)t; y1 ← ∅, y2 ← ∅
3 for i ∈ {d− 1, . . . , 1} do
4 for j ∈ {1, . . . , k} do
5 y1 ← y1 ∪ x
6 y2 ← y2 ∪ (ai · bj , . . . , ai · bj)t
7 x← y1 + y2
8 y1 ← ∅, y2 ← ∅
9 return x
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Lemma 5. Let d be a positive integer number and B = {b1, . . . , bk} be a set of k
integer numbers. Algorithm 4, given as input a d-dimensional vector a, outputs
the vector x of dimension kd such that for all x = atS(d). The time complexity
of the algorithm is O(kd).
Proof (of Lemma 5). The correctness of the algorithm follows from the recursive
structure of the matrix S(d) (see Equations (15) and (16)). At the i-th iteration
of the cycle (3-8) the algorithm performs k multiplications and ki+1 additions.
Number of iterations is (d − 1). Then, the overall number of multiplications is




Corollary 1. Let A be a matrix with R rows and d columns. The product of A
and S(d) can be computed in time O(R · kd).
Proof. In order to compute A · S(d) we need to compute the product of each of
the R rows of A with Sd. By Lemma 5 it can be done in time O(k
d). Then the
overall complexity of multiplying the matrices is O(R · kd).
4.2 Complexity of the attack
The pseudo-code corresponding to the full attack is given in Algorithm 5.
Theorem 4. Let α > 0, p ∈ (0; 1), S ∈ (0; 1), and n ∈ Z>0 be fixed constants.
Let s ∈ Bn and σ > 0. Suppose that Assumption 21 holds. Then, the time
complexity of solving the Search-LWEs,α problem with the probability of success
p by the attack described in Algorithm 5 is
Tdual hybrid = min
δ,n2
((





where R(n2, σ, p) = 8 · e4π
2σ2(n2 ln(2)− ln(ln(1/p))).
Proof. The attack can be divided in two steps: the lattice reduction step and the
exhaustive search for the second fraction of the secret key. The first step of the
attack takesR×m LWEs,α samples and transforms them intoR LWEs2,σ samples
such that s2 is the second fraction of the secret key s and the noise parameter
σ is bigger than the noise parameter α of the input. It takes time R · T (BKZδ).
Denote the matrix form of obtained LWE samples as (Â, b̂) ∈ (Tn2×R,TR).
At the search step, the goal is to recover s2 using the obtained LWE samples.
For each of the candidates for s2 the attack computes the error vector that
corresponds to R LWE samples obtained at the previous step. It is equivalent
to computing the following matrix expression:
Ê = B̂− ÂtS(n2) mod 1,
where S(n2) is the matrix composed of all vectors of the secret space of length
n2 written in lexicographic order and B̂ ∈ TR×|B|
n2
is the matrix formed of
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Algorithm 5: Hybrid key recovery attack
input : {(Ai,bi)}Ri=1, where ∀i Ai ∈ Tn×m, bi ∈ Tm, α > 0, S > 0, δ > 1,
n1 ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1}
output: s2 ∈ Bn−n1
1 recoverS({(Ai,bi)}Ri=1,α, S, δ, n1):
2 n2 ← (n− n1)






4 Â← ∅ , b̂← ∅
/* lattice reduction part */
5 for i ∈ {1, . . . , R} do
6 A← Ai, b← bi
7 (A1,A2)← splitMatrix(A, n1) . see Equation (12)
8 v← computeV(A1, S, α, δ) . Algorithm 3
9 Â← Â ∪ {A2v}, b̂← b̂ ∪ {vtb}
/* search for s2 */
10 S(n2) ←
matrix of all vectors in the secret space of dimension n2 in lexicographical order
11 B̂← (b̂, . . . , b̂) ∈ TR×|B|
n2
12 Ê← B̂− ÂtS(n2) mod 1 . see Corollary 1 and Algorithm 4
13 for i ∈ {1, . . . , |B|n2} do
14 ê← Ê[i]
/* guess the distribution of e (see Algorithm 1) */
15 if (distinguishGU(ê, σ) = G) then
16 return S(n2)[i]
|B|n2 repetition of the vector b̂. The complexity of computing that expression is
dominated by the complexity of computing the product of Ât ∈ TR×n2 and S(n2).
By Corollary 1, it can be computed in O(R · |B|n2) operations. Once the attack
obtain an error vector for each of the candidates, it guesses the distribution of
each error vector using Algorithm 1 and returns the candidate whose error vector
has concentrated around zero modular Gaussian distribution.
The time complexity of the attack is the sum of the complexities of the two
steps:
Tattack = R ·
(
|B|n2 + T (BKZδ)
)
. (18)
Now the goal is to evaluate the number of samples R needed to recover s2
with probability p. By Lemma 4, using Algorithm 1, we can guess correctly the







. In order to recover s2, we need successfully guess the distribution
for each of |B|n2 candidates. Assume that the distributions, produced by the
candidates are independent. Then, the probability to correctly recover s2 is at
least p
|B|n2















Let R be given by the following expression:
R = 8 · e4π
2σ2(n2 ln(2)− ln(ln(1/p))). (20)









Then, when n2 → ∞, p|B|
n2
σ → p. Thus, the sample size R, given by Equa-
tion (20) is sufficient to recover s2 with the probability p.
By combining Equations (18) and (20) we obtain the time complexity of the
attack.
4.3 Using sieving in the hybrid attack
Assume that BKZ uses a sieving algorithm (for instance [8]) as an SVP oracle. At
its penultimate step, the sieving algorithm produces many short vectors. Thus
we may suppose that BKZ with the sieving SVP oracle produces many short
vectors in one run. Then, if we need N short lattice vectors, we need to run





times, where m is the number of short vectors,
returned by the lattice reduction. In the following corollary from Theorem 4, we
use this property to revisit the time complexity of our attack under the sieving
BKZ cost model.
Corollary 2. Let α, p, n, σ and s ∈ {0; 1}n be as in Theorem 4. Assume that
the lattice reduction algorithm, used by Algorithm 2, uses the sieving algorithm
from [8] as an oracle for solving SVP. Suppose that Assumption 23 holds. Then,
the time complexity of solving the Search-LWEs,α problem with probability of









where β is the smallest blocksize such that the lattice reduction with the blocksize
β achieves the Hermite factor δ; R(n2, σ, p) is as defined in Theorem 4.
Proof. By Theorem 4, the time complexity of Algorithm 5 can be seen as the
sum of complexities of the two parts of the algorithm. The first part is producing
R short lattice vectors and the second part is evaluating R scalar products for
each of |B|n2 candidates for the secret key. As in the sieving model one run of the
lattice reduction produces (4/3)β/2 short vectors, the first part of Algorithm 5





, which implies that the complexity of Al-
gorithm 5 in the sieving BKZ cost model is given by Equation (22).
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4.4 The sparse case: size estimation and guessing a few bits
When the secret is sparse we can use so-called combinatorial techniques [2] to
leverage this sparsity. Assume that only h components of the secret are non-
zero. Then, we guess k zero components of the secret ~s and then run the full
attack in dimension (n − k). If the guess was incorrect, we restart with a new
and independent guess for the positions of zeroes. For sparse enough secrets, the
running time of the attack in smaller dimension trade-offs positively with the
failure probability.
Also, the variance of the scalar product ~vt~s is smaller in the sparse case be-
cause the variance of the key contains many zeros. Combining these observations,
we obtain the following result for sparse secrets:
Theorem 5. Let α > 0, n > 0 and fix s ∈ Bn. Suppose that s has exactly
0 6 h < n non-zero components. Suppose that Assumption 21 holds. Assume
that the lattice reduction algorithm, used by Algorithm 2, uses the sieving al-
gorithm from [8] as an oracle for solving SVP. Then, the time complexity of
solving Decision-LWEs,α with probability of success p by the distinguishing at-










· Thybrid(n− k, α)
)
(23)
where β is the smallest blocksize such that the lattice reduction with the blocksize
β achieves the Hermite factor δ; σ and N(σ, p) are as defined in Theorem 3.
Proof. Asserting that only h coefficients are non-zero yields that the probability

















The end of the proof scheme is the same as for Theorem 4,
with the only difference that the variance of the vector ẽ of Equation (14) is now




















5 Bit-security estimation and experimental verification
We implement an estimator script for the attack that, given parameters of an
LWE problem and a BKZ cost model as an input, finds optimal parameters for
the dual attack (see Section 3) and our hybrid attack (see Section 4). Using this
script, we evaluate the computational costs for a wide range of small-secret LWE
parameters. In this section, we report the results of our numerical estimation and
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show that the security level of the TFHE scheme should be updated with regards
to the hybrid attack. We also apply our attack to the parameters of FHEW,
SEAL, and HElib. For completeness purposes, in Section 6.5 we also provide
an in-depth comparison with the primal unique-SVP technique. Eventually, we
support our argument by an implementation working on a small example.
5.1 Bit-security of LWE parameters
We numerically estimate the cost of solving LWE problem by the dual attack (as
described in Section 3) and by our attacks for all pairs of parameters the (n, α)
from the following set: (n,− log(α)) ∈ {100, 125, . . . , 1050} × {5, 6.25, . . . , 38.5}.
We create a heatmap representing the cost of our attack as a function of param-
eters n and α.
In Figure 1 we present an estimation of the bit-security of the LWE parame-
ters according to the combination of our attack and the collision attack, with time
complexity 2n/2. Thus, Figure 1 represents the function min(TourAttack(n, α), 2
n/2),
where TourAttack(n, α) is the cost of our attack for the parameters n and α. Fig-
ure 1 is obtained under the sieving BKZ cost model.
























Fig. 1: Bit-security as a function of the LWE parameters n and α assuming the
sieving BKZ cost model. Here, n denotes the dimension, α denotes the stan-
dard deviation of the noise, the secret key is chosen from the uniform distri-
bution on {0, 1}n. The picture represents the security level λ of LWE samples,
λ = log(min(TourAttack(n, α), 2
n/2)). The numbered lines on the picture repre-
sent security levels. The star symbol denotes the old TFHE key switching pa-
rameters from [20], the diamond symbol denotes the key switching parameters
recommended in [21, Table 4].
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We also created similar heatmaps for our hybrid dual attack and the dual
attack described in Section 3 under three BKZ cost models: enumeration, siev-
ing, and delta-squared. For completeness, these heatmaps are presented in Sec-
tion 6.4.
5.2 Application to FHE schemes
Non-sparse small secrets. TFHE. The TFHE scheme uses two sets of param-
eters: for the switching key and for the bootstrapping key. The security of the
scheme is defined by the security of the switching key, which is the weaker link.
The parameters of the TFHE scheme were updated several times. In Table 2,
we presents the results of our estimates for the recently updated parameters from
the public implementation [40, v1.1]. For completeness, we also re-evaluate the
security all the previous sets of TFHE parameters. The results for the previous
parameters of TFHE can be found in Section 6.2.
Table 2: Security of the parameters of the TFHE scheme from the public imple-
mentation [40] (parameter’s update of February 21, 2020) against dual attack
(as described in Section 3) and hybrid dual attack (as described in Section 4).
λ denotes security in bits, δ and n1 are the optimal parameters for the attacks.
“-” means that the distinguishing attack doesn’t have the parameter n1.
BKZ model
switching key
n = 630, α = 2−15
bootstrapping key
n = 1024, α = 2−25
delta-squared
attack λ δ n1
dual 270 1.0042 -
new attack 176 1.005 485
attack λ δ n1
dual 256 1.0042 -
new attack 190 1.0048 862
sieving
dual 131 1.0044 -
new attack 121 1.0047 576
dual 131 1.0044 -
new attack 125 1.0046 967
enumeration
dual 292 1.0042 -
new attack 192 1.0052 469
dual 280 1.0041 -
new attack 209 1.0049 842
FHEW. The fully homomorphic encryption scheme FHEW [22], as TFHE,
uses binary secrets. Its parameters are given as n = 500, σ = 217, q = 232.
The bit-security of these parameters under our hybrid dual attack in the sieving
model is 96 bits, which is slightly better than the primal or dual attack estimated
with [4] giving respectively 101 and 115 bits of security.
SEAL. The SEAL v2.0 homomorphic library [32] uses ternary non-sparse
secrets. We target these parameters directly with our hybrid approach and com-
pare the (best) results with the dual attack of [2]. The results are compiled in
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Table 7 of Section 6.3. The results are very slightly better for our techniques,
although being very comparable.
Sparse secrets: HElib. The HElib homomorphic library [29] uses ternary sparse
secrets which have exactly 64 non-zero components. We can then target these
parameters using the combination of our hybrid attack with guessing. The results
are compiled in Table 8 and Table 9, both given in Section 6.3. The results are
very slightly worse for our techniques, although are still very comparable. A
reason might be that the exploitation of the sparsity in our case is more naive
than the range of techniques used in [2]. An interesting open question would be
to merge the best of these two worlds to get even stronger attacks. We leave this
question for future work as it is slightly out of the scope of the present paper.
5.3 Experimental verification
In order to verify the correctness of our attack, we have implemented it on
small examples. Our implementation recovers 5 bits of a secret key for LWE
problems with the following two sets of parameters: (n, α) = (30, 2−8) and
(n, α) = (50, 2−8). For implementation purposes, we rescaled all the elements de-
fined over torus T to integers modulo 232. For both examples, we use BKZ with
blocksize 20, which yields the quality of the lattice reduction around δ . 1.013.
We computed the values of parameters of the attack required to guess correctly
5 bits of the key with probability 0.99 assuming that quality of the output of
BKZ. The required parameters for both experiments are summarized in Table 3.
(n,− log(α)) m σ R
(30,8) 76 0.0521 32
(50,8) 90 0.126 74
Table 3: Parameters required for guessing 5 bits of the key with δ = 1.013. m is
the number of samples needed for one lattice reduction (28), σ is the parameter
of modular Gaussian distribution Gσ ( Lemma 3), R is the number of samples
needed to distinguish distributions Gσ and U (20).
The first experiment was repeated 20 times, the second was repeated 10
times. For both experiments, the last five bits of the key were successfully recov-
ered at all attempts. The correctness of both attacks rely on assumptions made
in Lemma 3 for approximating the distribution of vt(Ats + e) mod 1 by modu-
lar Gaussian distribution Gσ. In order to verify these assumptions, while running
both experiments we have collected samples to check the distribution: each time
when the attack found correctly the last bits of the secret key s2, we collected
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the corresponding ẽ = b̃ − ãts2 = vt(Ats1 + e). For the first experiment, the
size of the collected sample is 20 × R1 = 640, for the second experiment, it is
10×R2 = 740. The collected data is presented in Figure 2.







n = 30, = 0.0521
g
(a)










n = 50, = 0.126
g
(b)
Fig. 2: Distribution of ẽ = vt(Ats1 + e) mod 1.
Figure 3a represents data from the experiment with parameters (n, α) = (30, 2−8),
figure 3b represents data from the experiment with parameters (n, α) = (50, 2−8).
Blue histograms denote observed data, orange lines denote theoretical predictions of
the distribution.
In Table 4, we compare theoretical predictions and estimations obtained from
the experiments for the parameters of modular Gaussian distribution Gσ. Exper-
imental estimations of mean and variance in both cases match closely theoretical
predictions.
Table 4: Estimated mean and variance for the Gaussian Gσ.
(n, α) sample size σ Var(Gσ) est. variance average of sample
(30, 2−8) 640 0.0521 0.00271 0.002619 -0.00207
(50, 2−8) 740 0.126 0.1587 0.14515 0.0064
5.4 Experimental verification of the assumptions on sieving’s
output
For the analysis of our attack under the sieving BKZ cost model we assume






short lattice vectors, where β
is the blocksize of BKZ (see Section 2.3). In order to check the correctness of
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the assumption, we studied the distribution of vectors returned by the sieving
algorithm on random lattices in several small dimensions.
In order to test our assumption, we used the implementation of the GaussSieve
algorithm [36] from fplll [24] as model of the sieving oracle. We used knapsack-
like random lattices generated by the program ./latticegen from fplll as input
for the GaussSieve algorithm.
First, we look at the distribution of the vectors returned by the GaussSieve
algorithm on a random knapsack-like lattice of dimension 50 and volume close
to 21000. Figure 3 represents the histogram of the norms of the vectors returned
by the sieving algorithm. For such input lattice we assume that the size of the




)50/2 ≈ 1329 and that the norms of the vectors are close
to
√
n · vol(Λ)1/n =
√
50 · 21000/50 ≈ 7.4 · 106. As Figure 3 shows, GaussSieve
returned 3854 different lattice vectors which is almost three times more than
expected. Moreover, all the vectors are short enough for our purposes; they all
have norms between 2 · 106 and 2.7 · 106 which is of the same order (and even












Sieving output, d = 50, bits = 1000, |L| = 3854
= 2352999.75, = 91087.12
Fig. 3: The histogram of the norms of the vectors returned by the GaussSieve
algorithm on a random lattice of dimension 50 and volume ≈ 21000. |L| denotes
the number of vectors returned by the algorithm, µ is the average norm of the
vectors, σ is the estimation of the standard devination of the norm. The dark blue
line represents the density function of the normal distribution with parameters
µ and σ.
We tried several other combinations of volume and dimension for input lat-
tices and obtained essentially the same results: the size of the list was always a
small constant factor bigger than expected (4/3)n/2 and the norms of the vectors
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in the list were concentrated around a value of order
√
n · vol(Λ)1/n. Figures 4
and 5 represents our results.
In Figure 4, we fix the volume of the lattice to be 21000 and see how the size
of the list and the norms of the returned vectors change with the dimension.














Sieving output, list size, lattice volume 21000
expected
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Fig. 4: Output of the GaussSieve on the lattices of dimension 30, 30, 50, 60,
and 65 and of volume around 21000. The left picture represents the logarithm





, the right picture represents the logarithm of the average, min-
























Sieving output, list size, dim = 50
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Fig. 5: Output of the GaussSieve on the lattices of dimension 50 and of vol-
umes several volumes from 2500 to 23000. The left picture represents the log-





, the right picture represents the logarithm of the average,







In Figure 5, we fix the dimension of the lattice to be 50 and see how the size
of the list and the norms of the returned vectors change when volume changes.
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6 Supporting material
6.1 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Under Assumption 21, the coordinates of wq are independent and dis-
tributed according to the Gaussian distribution with expectation 0 and standard
deviation δn+m/
√
n+m. Since wq = (q·x || q−n/m·v)t, the coordinates of vectors














be the standard deviation of coordinates of x and of v correspondingly. Consider
the distribution of
vtb = xts + vte =
n∑
i=1




vtb is a sum of m+n independent random variables and, therefore, its distribu-
tion can be approximated by a Gaussian distribution according to the Central
Limit Theorem. In order to learn the parameters of the Gaussian, we need to
obtain the expectations and variances of xi · si and vi · ei.
First, consider the distribution of xi · si. As si is drawn uniformly in B, xisi
is a random variable from the distribution that can be obtained by sampling
b ∈ B with probability B−1 and then sampling from a Gaussian distribution
with mean 0 and variance b2σ2x. Therefore, E(xi · si) = 0 and Var(xi · si) = S2σ2x




Then, consider v1e1. As v and e are independent and E(v1) = E(e1) = 0,
E(v1e1) = E(v1)E(e1) = 0 and Var(v1e1) = Var(v1) ·Var(e1) = α2σ2v.
Thus, the distribution of vtb is close to the Gaussian distribution with ex-
pectation 0 and variance











Our goal is to obtain a distribution that is as concentrated around zero as pos-
sible. Hence we choose parameters m and q in order to minimize variance of
vtb.
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Then, we find the optimal value of m by differentiating ln(σ):
∂ ln(σ)
∂m












Now, replacing m by mopt in Equation (26), we find:







The distance between the distribution of vtb and the Gaussian distribution
with mean 0 and variance σ2 can be estimated by the Berry-Esseen inequality
(see Theorem 1). To use this inequality, we need to compute the third absolute
moments of x1s1 and v1e1.
We start with x1s1. As x1 and s1 are independent,
E{|x1s1|3} = E{|x1|3}E{|s1|3}.
By Lemma 2, E{|x1|3} = 2
√
2/πσ3x. As s1 has the Bernoulli distribution with
parameter S2, E{|s1|3} = E{s1} = S2. Putting two parts together, we get
ρx1s1 = E{|x1s1|3} = 2
√
2/πS2σ3x. (29)





Denote the cumulative distribution function of vtb by Fvtb, and denote the
cumulative distribution function of the Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and






























6.2 Security of TFHE parameters from the papers [19,21]
In Table 5 we present the results of our estimates for the parameters from [19];
in Table 6, we present the security estimates for more recent parameters from [21].
Table 5: Security of the parameters of the TFHE scheme from [19] (the same as
from [21, Table 3]) against dual attack (as described in Section 3) and hybrid
dual attack (as described in Section 4). λ denotes security in bits, δ and n1 are
the optimal parameters for the attacks. “-” means that the distinguishing attack
doesn’t have the parameter n1.
BKZ model
switching key
n = 500, α = 2.54 · 10−5
bootstrapping key
n = 1024, α = 3.73 · 10−9
delta-squared
attack λ δ n1
dual 169 1.0052 -
new attack 119 1.0059 406
attack λ δ n1
dual 204 1.0046 -
new attack 160 1.0051 889
sieving
dual 102 1.0054 -
new attack 94 1.0058 455
dual 117 1.0048 -
new attack 112 1.005 972
enumeration
dual 195 1.0052 -
new attack 137 1.0062 388
dual 230 1.0046 -
new attack 180 1.0052 868
6.3 Attack results on FHE schemes
In this appendix we present the various practical results obtained on the schemes
SEAL and HElib.
6.4 Heatmaps for comparing our hybrid dual attack and the dual
attack as described in Section 3
In this section, we present the results of comparison of our hybrid dual attack
with the dual attack described in Section 3 under three different BKZ cost mod-
els. In Figure 6, the left heatmap represents the logarithm of the time complexity
of the dual attack while the right heatmap represents the logarithm of the time
complexity of our attack. Figure 6 shows that for the same sets of parameters
the cost of our attack is always less than or equal to the cost of the dual distin-
guishing attack and that the difference between the costs of the attacks is bigger
when the dimension n and the noise parameter α is bigger.
Figures 7 and 8 represent the similar results for the enumeration and delta-
squared BKZ cost models.
Figure 9 presents results similar to Figure 1, but under the enumeration and
delta-squared BKZ cost models.
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Table 6: Security of the parameters of the TFHE scheme from [21, Table 4])
against dual attack (as described in Section 3), hybrid dual attack (as described
in Section 4), and the uSVP attack (denoted as “primal”). λ denotes security in
bits, δ and n1 are the optimal parameters for the attacks. “-” means that the
distinguishing attack doesn’t have the parameter n1.
BKZ model
switching key
n = 612, α = 2−15
bootstrapping key
n = 1024, α = 2−26
delta-squared
attack λ δ n1
dual 194 1.0045 -
primal 198 1.0042 -
new attack 169 1.0051 474
attack λ δ n1
dual 191 1.0045 -
primal 203 1.0043 -
new attack 179 1.0049 871
sieving
dual 144 1.0043 -
primal 127 1.0045 -
new attack 118 1.0048 559
dual 134 1.0043 -
primal 123 1.0043 -
new attack 120 1.0047 970
enumeration
dual 239 1.0043 -
primal 219 1.0045 -
new attack 185 1.0053 457
dual 222 1.0045 -
primal 210 1.0043 -
new attack 179 1.0049 871
6.5 Comparison with primal uSVP attack
The security of the recent parameters from TFHE’s implementation is evaluated
using the LWE estimator from [4, 6]. As the results of this estimation suggest,
under the sieving BKZ cost model, the best attack against the current parameters
of the TFHE scheme among the attacks presented in the LWE estimator is the
primal uSVP attack [7] (see also [6, Section 6.3] for the description of the attack).
Therefore, it is interesting to compare our hybrid dual attack with the primal
uSVP attack on a wider range of parameters.
In order to compare our attack with the primal uSVP attack, we estimate the
time complexity of both attacks for each pair of the parameters (n, α) from the
following set: (n,− log(α)) ∈ {200, 250, . . . , 1450}×{10, 12, . . . , 48}. We evaluate
Table 7: Security of the SEAL v2.0 library parameters against the dual attack from [2]
and against our hybrid dual attack. n denotes the dimension, q is the modulus, the
standard deviation is given by σ = 3.2 for sets of parameters.
SEAL params. dual attack from [2] our attack
n = 1024, q = 247.5 68 67
n = 2048, q = 295.4 69 68
n = 4096, q = 2192 68 67
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Table 8: Security of the HElib library parameters (80-bit) against the dual attack
from [2] and against our hybrid dual attack. n denotes the dimension, q is the modulus,
the standard deviation is given by σ = 3.2 for sets of parameters.
HElib params. dual attack from [2] our attack
n = 1024, q = 285.2 61 64
n = 2048, q = 285.2 65 65
n = 4096, q = 285.3 67 69
Table 9: Security of the HElib library parameters (120-bit) against the dual
attack from [2] and against our hybrid dual attack. Notation is as in Table 8
HElib params. dual attack from [2] our attack
n = 1024, q = 238 73 77
n = 2048, q = 270 77 79
n = 4096, q = 2134 81 85
the cost of the primal uSVP attack using the LWE estimator [4, 6]. For this
comparison, we consider two BKZ cost models: sieving and enumeration. The
results of our estimation are presented in Figures 10 and 11.
Figures 10 and 11 show that under both BKZ cost models, it is not so that
one attack is better than another for all the sets of the parameters. Under both
BKZ cost models, the primal uSVP attack outperforms the hybrid dual attack
when the dimension is high (i.e., n > 800) and the noise parameter is small (i.e.,
α < 2−35 ). For the rest of the parameters that we consider, the hybrid dual
attack outperforms the primal uSVP attack. The difference in the cost of the
attacks depends on the chosen BKZ cost model; for the enumeration BKZ cost
model the difference between attacks in more significant than for the sieving
model.
In particular, as reported in Table 1, for the practical security parameters of
TFHE, the hybrid dual attack we propose in this work is slightly better than
the primal attack technique.
35



















































































Fig. 6: Comparison of the costs of the attacks under the sieving BKZ cost model.
Here, n and α denote the dimension and the standard deviation of the noise of
LWE samples, TD denotes the time complexity of the dual distinguishing attack,
TK denotes the time complexity of our key recovery attack.

























































Fig. 7: Comparison of the costs of the attacks under the enumeration BKZ cost
model.
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Fig. 8: Comparison of the costs of the attacks under the delta-squared BKZ cost
model.























































Fig. 9: Bit-security as a function of the LWE parameters n and α under the
enumeration and delta-squared BKZ cost models.
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(a) primal uSVP attack































































Fig. 10: Comparison of the costs of the hybrid dual attack and primal uSVP
attack from [7] under the enumeration BKZ cost model. Here, n and α denote
the dimension and the standard deviation of the noise of LWE samples, TP
denotes the time complexity of the primal uSVP attack, THD denotes the time
complexity of our hybrid dual attack, λP − λHD := log(TP )− log(THD).
38






























(a) primal uSVP attack
























































Fig. 11: Comparison of the costs of the hybrid dual attack and primal uSVP
attack from [7] under the sieving BKZ cost model. Here, n and α denote the
dimension and the standard deviation of the noise of LWE samples, TP denotes
the time complexity of the primal uSVP attack, THD denotes the time complexity
of our hybrid dual attack, λP − λHD := log(TP )− log(THD).
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